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Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What 
Federal Lawmakers Should Take from 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the decision in Miller v. Alabama1 was announced, my colleagues 
and I at Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) cheered its ringing 
endorsement of proportionality and individualized sentencing.  FAMM, after 
all, was formed in 1991 to champion sentencing discretion and work to elimi-
nate laws and policies that require judges to impose pre-set minimum sen-
tences.  In its earliest days, FAMM found its unique voice by gathering, dis-
tilling, and telling the stories of individuals who received disproportionate 
sentences because of mandatory sentencing laws.  Part of our job to this day, 
more than twenty-two years later, remains to tell anyone who will listen, and 
especially lawmakers, that a defendant facing sentencing deserves to be seen 
as more than the crime for which he or she was convicted.  An essential part 
of our work is giving a voice to people who were, for all intents and purposes, 
silenced at sentencing. 
In this Article, I make the case that, while the robust proportionality 
principles informing Miller and similar cases are unlikely to translate into the 
end of mandatory minimum sentencing by way of the Eighth Amendment (at 
least anytime soon), embracing sentencing proportionality is the key for law-
makers who are – or should be – addressing the unsustainable growth in the 
federal prison population as a distinct threat to public safety.  Politicians who 
support mandatory minimums have been immune over the years to the many 
reasoned arguments about how unjust those sentences are and what costs they 
pose to families and communities.  Mandatory minimum sentences have been 
touted as necessary to keep the public safe, and support for these sentences 
has been seen as politically expedient.  Even empirical arguments demon-
strating that getting rid of mandatory sentencing will not harm public safety 
have fallen on deaf ears.  We grew a criminal justice system addicted to solv-
ing social and public safety problems with incarceration and we combined 
that system with a long-simmering distrust of the judiciary, thereby creating 
mandatory minimums that dominate the sentencing field, directly and indi-
rectly, through their sentencing guideline proxies. 
  
 * Mary Price is the General Counsel of Families Against Mandatory Minimums 
(FAMM). 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
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However, today federal lawmakers face a new challenge: the burgeoning 
prison population consumes an ever-growing portion of the budget of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).2  This threatens the budgets for the DOJ’s other 
components, including those directly responsible for public safety, such as the 
FBI, and those that fund grants to state and local law enforcement.  A number 
of states – including conservative states – for which the problem of over-
incarceration surfaced with greater urgency over the last seven years initiated 
measures to stabilize their prison populations, if not reduce them.3  Those 
states were laboratories for change and caught the attention of traditional 
supporters of harsh sentencing policies: conservative lawmakers and opinion 
leaders who are speaking out about mass incarceration, the influence of sen-
tencing, and even mandatory minimums.  Some of these conservative politi-
cians and opinion leaders even made common cause with their liberal coun-
terparts to take a look at over-criminalization, over-federalization, and even 
early release mechanisms. 
In this Article, I draw a connection between mandatory minimum sen-
tencing and the growth of the federal prison population; mandatory mini-
mums have required and influenced unduly lengthy sentences that are neither 
individualized nor proportionate.  Proportionate sentencing, on the other 
hand, results in lower sentences, not to mention bed and cost savings.  While 
“back-end” reforms to encourage the earlier release of prisoners are com-
mendable, front-end reforms that result in lower sentences are essential if we 
are to make a lasting impact on the size of the federal prison population.  
Sentencing policies that embrace proportionality are key to stabilizing and 
reducing overcrowding.  Of course, proportionality as an end in itself is ideal, 
but those of us who advocate for change may have to settle for selling sen-
tencing proportionality as an indispensable means to a necessary end.   
II.  MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
Mandatory minimum sentencing is the antithesis of individualized sen-
tencing.  In its purest form, a mandatory minimum is set by legislators and 
triggered by a conviction for a qualifying crime, by the crime’s “offense 
characteristics,” or by reference to an underlying or prior offense.4  In crimi-
  
 2. See JULIE SAMUELS, ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., STEMMING 
THE TIDE:  STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE GROWTH AND CUT THE COST OF THE FEDERAL 
PRISON SYSTEM 2 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded 
PDF/412932-stemming-the-tide.pdf 
 3. Ron French, Shifting Prison Politics: How GOP Is Getting Smarter on 
Crime, BRIDGE MAG. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://bridgemi.com/2012/02/politics-of-
prisons-shifting/; see also The Pew Charitable Trusts, States Cut Both Crime and 
Imprisonment (Dec. 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-visualizations/ 
states-cut-both-crime-and-imprisonment-85899528171.  
 4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter 
 
2
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nal justice systems with determinate sentencing – which elevates certainty 
about the length of imprisonment over other considerations – the term is unre-
lieved by parole.  There is also no so-called “second look” opportunity for 
courts to consider whether an imposed mandatory minimum sentence contin-
ues to serve the ends of justice following its imposition and the passage of 
time.5  This commitment to finality is enshrined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), 
which provides only a handful of opportunities – none of which are available 
to the court in the first instance6 – to revisit a sentence once it is finalized.  
The federal government’s latest grand experiment with mandatory min-
imums7 began in the mid-1980s and was prompted in part by a repudiation of 
the rehabilitative model of sentencing and the elevation of a model designed 
to ensure more certainty, fewer differences among and between sentences, 
and, in the words of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission), “more 
appropriately punitive” sentences.8  The mandatory minimums adopted (for 
drug offenses)9 or increased (for gun offenses)10 during this period were gen-
  
2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_ 
and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_P
enalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm.  
 5. The purposes of punishment are set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006),  
and can be roughly summarized as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation        
and rehabilitation. 
 6. The court may reduce an imposed sentence to grant “compassionate release” 
from prison for “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” but only upon motion 
by the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006); reduce a sentence 
for substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others but only on 
motion by the government, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e) (2006), and FED. R. CRIM. P. 35; or reduce a sentence imposed under the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines, but only if the applicable sentencing guideline has 
subsequently been lowered by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and that lower sen-
tence deemed “retroactive” by the Commission, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) 
and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 (2012). 
 7. For a discussion of the history of mandatory minimums, see 2011 
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-34.  See also MOLLY M. GILL, 
FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, CORRECTING COURSE: LESSONS FROM 
THE 1970 REPEAL OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS 7-17, available at http://www. 
famm.org/Repository/Files/8189_FAMM_BoggsAct_final.pdf. 
 8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT], available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/137910NCJRS.pdf. 
 9. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.             
3207 (1986). 
 10. For example, in 1984, Congress increased the one-year mandatory minimum 
for using or carrying a firearm while committing a felony adopted in 1970 to five 
years when used in connection with a crime of violence, Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)), and 
amended it again in 1986 to enhance firearm mandatory minimums when associated 
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erated around drug-based street wars of the 1980s and remain, with two nota-
ble exceptions,11 on the books and in the toolboxes of prosecutors to this day.  
Mandatory minimums have continued to grow over the years, both in number 
and in length; they now number more than 190.12  
Judges are constrained to impose the mandatory minimum sentence 
when certain triggering conditions, such as drug type and quantity13 or the use 
of a gun,14 are met and, unless federal law has carved out an exception,15 may 
not impose a lower sentence.  Such a rigidly-structured system is inhospitable 
ground for considerations of proportionality – the notion that a punishment 
should fit the crime – and individualization, the notion that the punishment 
should fit the offender.  Congress knew full well how to fashion a system that 
accounted for such things.  We know that because, remarkably, just two years 
before Congress adopted the modern-era mandatory minimums, it passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).16  The SRA was a criminal justice system 
game changer; it abolished parole, ushered in determinate sentencing, and 
ended an era of uncabined judicial discretion.17  It directed the creation of the 
Commission and charged it with promulgating sentencing guidelines.18 
However, the SRA also produced the federal statute governing sen-
tencing that establishes a roadmap for proportionate, individualized sentenc-
ing.  Courts are directed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to undertake a series of   
considerations in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender,     
including evaluating individual features of the crime and characteristics of the 
offender.  These considerations include the nature and seriousness of the of-
fense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the sentences available 
under the law, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among 
  
with drug trafficking offenses.  Act of May 19, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 
Stat. 449, 456-45 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924).  
 11. In 1994, Congress adopted the Safety Valve, permitting courts to waive 
mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug defendants who met a set of narrow 
criteria, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006), and in 2010, following years of criticism and 
efforts to eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, Con-
gress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 
(amending 21 U.S.C. 841 (b)(1) (2006)), raising the amount of crack cocaine neces-
sary to trigger the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences.  
 12. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at tbl.A-1.  The drug 
and gun mandatory minimums, while not the only ones, are however the ones most 
frequently invoked.  Id. at 73 fig.4-6. 
 13. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. 2011). 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 15. See supra note 11; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (providing a      
waiver on the government’s motion if the defendant has provided substantial assis-
tance to the government). 
 16. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98        
Stat. 1987.   
 17. See id.  
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).  
4
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similarly situated defendants.19  The statute mandates that the sentence im-
posed at the end of that structured inquiry be “sufficient but not greater than 
necessary”20 to comply with the purposes of punishment: just punishment, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  In other words, the sentence 
must be proportionate.   
Sadly, the promise of proportionality and parsimony was undermined by 
lawmakers suspicious of judges and judicial discretion – prompting Professor 
Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes to name their history of the period Fear 
of Judging.21  An amendment to the SRA, codified at § 3553(b), was inter-
preted22 to ensure that the guidelines would be – for all intents and purposes – 
mandatory, barring an unusual factor not accounted for in the drafting of the 
guideline sufficient to warrant a “departure.”23  The tantalizing promise of 
proportionate sentences arrived at by weighing individual characteristics to 
determine culpability and features of the offense was abandoned in favor of a 
complex set of guidelines, many of which were in turn indexed to statutory 
mandatory minimums.24   
III.  HOPE FROM THE COURT? 
A.  Sixth Amendment Challenges 
Individualized sentencing, proportionality, and parsimony were essen-
tially stillborn and remained unused for the most part until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker over twenty years after the en-
actment of the SRA.  Relying on the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury 
trial, a 5-4 majority in Booker held that the sentencing guidelines were un-
constitutional to the extent that they required judges to increase sentences 
above the top of a guideline range using facts not pled by the prosecution, 
admitted by the defendant, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.25   
However, the guidelines were salvaged – albeit as advice rather than as 
mandate – by a slightly different 5-4 majority, which excised two provisions 
in federal law: the aforementioned § 3553(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which 
appellate courts used to ensure that district court judges did not stray far from 
  
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
 20. Id.  This parsimony mandate was secured by the prescient intervention of 
Sen. Charles Mathias (D-MD).  See 130 CONG. REC. 29,870 (1984); see also John 
Conyers Jr., Unresolved Issues in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, 32 FED. B. 
NEWS & J. 68, 69 (1985) (attributing parsimony mandate to Sen. Mathias). 
 21. KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 177 (1998).  
 22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).  For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the 
guidelines into their all but mandatory state, see Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, 
Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1641-57 (2012). 
 23. See § 3553(b). 
 24. See infra Part V.B.  
 25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
5
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the sentencing guidelines.26  Doing so effectively transformed mandatory 
guidelines into advisory guidelines.  The guideline structure and instructions 
remained essentially intact, save for their power over sentencing, which was 
altered to elevate judicial discretion.  Subsequent decisions reinforced Booker 
and strengthened judicial discretion in sentencing.27  The decision and its 
progeny breathed new life into the promise of proportionality in § 3553(a). 
Consequently, there are two systems of determining punishment that ex-
ist in tension.  One – defined by criminal statutes that provide for mandatory 
minimums – permits no individualization and accordingly often results in 
disproportionate sentences.28  The other, which is defined by statutes that do 
not require mandatory minimums, requires an individualized inquiry.  Where 
the law provides for a mandatory minimum sentence, the judge must impose 
it unless the defendant provided substantial assistance or is eligible for a 
waiver under the federal safety valve.29  In cases where no mandatory mini-
mum is implicated, the judge may impose the calculated guideline sentence or 
she may vary from the guideline sentence if it fails to survive the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) inquiry. 
Booker’s outcome and the transformation from mandatory to advisory 
guideline sentencing depended not on the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment but on the right to jury trial embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment.30  While Booker elevated judicial discretion and individualized 
sentencing under the guidelines, those outcomes are only byproducts of the 
Court’s principal mission: to secure the Sixth Amendment right to a jury.  
The Court was not principally concerned with proportionality or even indi-
vidualization in Booker and its progeny.   
The Sixth Amendment line of cases did recently reach a subset of man-
datory minimums, altering how some are achieved.  In Alleyne v. United 
States, decided in June 2013, the Supreme Court held that, because mandato-
ry minimums increase the penalty for the crime, any fact that increases a 
mandatory minimum is an offense element and must be submitted to the jury 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.31  The decision was a straightforward, 
but hard-fought extension of the so-called Apprendi rule.  The Apprendi rule 
commands that any fact that increases the range of punishment to which a 
defendant is exposed is an element of the crime and must be presented to the 
  
 26. Id. at 245. 
 27. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see also Spears v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009). 
 28. The problems of mandatory minimums are documented at length.  See gen-
erally 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8; 2011 MANDATORY 
MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4; Stories, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
http://famm.org/stories/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 29. For a fuller discussion of the safety valve, see infra Part VI.  
 30. Booker, 543 U.S. at 267-68.  
 31. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).  
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/7
File: 10.Price.F Created on: 3/18/2014 5:32:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:48:00 PM 
2013] MILL(ER)ING MANDATORY MINIMUMS 1153 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.32  Until Alleyne, the Court had 
exempted mandatory minimums from the Apprendi rule.33  
Sixth Amendment-based sentencing reforms have not extended to jury 
sentencing.  While juries have a key role in finding the facts and assessing 
guilt, they have no direct role in sentencing and judges do not inform them of 
the sentencing implications of conviction; however, some federal judges have 
tested the waters of jury sentencing when faced with what they considered 
excessive mandatory minimums.  In one famous example, Judge Jack Wein-
stein of the Eastern District of New York dismissed the jury’s conviction of a 
man found to have received child pornography because the jury was not ad-
vised of the five-year sentence the conviction carried.34  Judge Weinstein 
polled the jurors following the verdict and found that knowledge of the man-
datory minimum would have changed some votes for conviction.35  The rul-
ing was overturned on appeal.36 Judge Paul Cassell of the District of Utah, 
facing sentencing Weldon Angelos to a fifty-five year mandatory minimum 
sentence for possessing a gun on three occasions while selling small amounts 
of marijuana, polled the jurors before imposing a sentence.37  He provided 
them with information about Angelos’ limited criminal history, told them that 
there was no parole in the federal system, and asked them what would be the 
appropriate sentence.38  None recommended a sentence anywhere near the 
fifty-five years Judge Cassell was forced to impose.39  Judge James S. Gwin 
of the Northern District of Ohio enlisted other Midwest judges in an experi-
ment, in which they surveyed jurors following twenty-two trials, asking what 
sentence the jurors would impose.40  The suggested sentences were markedly 
different from those required by the Sentencing Guidelines and were also 
below the sentences that were enhanced by mandatory minimums.41 
  
 32. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
 33. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that jury fact-
finding is not necessary when a fact is used to enhance a mandatory minimum within 
the range of punishment otherwise authorized by the jury), overruled by Alleyne, 133 
S. Ct. 2151.  
 34. United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and 
remanded sub nom.; see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 35. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d. at 146; see also Colin Moynihan, Judge Defies Prosecu-
tors on Pornography Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/nyregion/14weinstein.html?_r=0.  
 36. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d. 142.  
 37. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230, 1242 (D. Utah 2004). 
 38. Id. at 1242.  
 39. Id.  The jury’s mean recommended sentence was eighteen years; the median 
was fifteen years.  Id. 
 40. James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173,      
174 (2010).  
 41. Id. at 188-89 (noting that the average juror recommended sentence was sixty-
five months, while the average guideline minimum sentence was 138 months); see 
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Despite these forays into jury involvement in mandatory sentencing, 
there is little appetite to involve juries in deciding prison terms.  Whatever 
potential the Sixth Amendment held for mandatory minimum reform appears 
to have been realized, at least for the time being. 
B.  Eighth Amendment Challenges 
The Eighth Amendment is similarly limited, at least vis-à-vis mandatory 
sentencing overall.  The decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Flori-
da before it are solidly grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on         
disproportionately severe punishment, and seemingly offering some hope that 
mandatory minimums may be assailable as failing to provide for mitigation to 
check unduly harsh sentences.  Graham tantalizingly discusses culpability, 
not merely in light of the crime but also with respect to the defendant’s char-
acteristics.42  Miller endorses the concept that punishment “should be       
graduated to both the offender and the offense.”43  In contrast, mandatory 
minimums rely most heavily on the crime and one or two facts about it, such 
as drug quantity, and only consider offender characteristics, such as criminal 
history, in aggravation.44  And while a sentence may be appropriately severe 
in some cases, mandatory minimums ensure that they are applied in all cases, 
including those where the punishment will be disproportionately severe.45  
But, while the Eighth Amendment recognizes the right to be secure from  
excessive sanctions – a right that flows from the principle that punishment be 
“graduated and proportionate” to both the crime and the offender – it has not 
been interpreted to bar mandatory minimum penalties outright.46  That said, 
  
also id. at 196-200 tbl.3 (comparing guideline and statutory sentences with those 
settled on by jurors). 
 42. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  
 43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 44. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (doubling 10 year mandatory 
minimum to 20 years for second offense); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (provid-
ing for 25-year mandatory minimum for defendant’s second or successive use of a 
gun in connection with a drug trafficking or crime of violence). 
 45. As Professor O’Hear points out, Miller evinces distrust, not of LWOP per se 
but of mandatory minimum sentences: “LWOP for juvenile killers . . . [would be] 
categorically acceptable[ if] imposed on a discretionary basis [has become] unconsti-
tutional solely where it is mandatory.”  Michael M O’Hear, Not Just Kids Stuff?, 78 
MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013).  
 46. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (holding that a 
mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole for a drug offense involving 650 
grams or more of cocaine or heroin by a first time offender does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment, because, while such a sentence may be cruel, it is not unusual and is not 
unconstitutional simply due to the fact that it is mandatory); see also Ewing v. Cali-
fornia, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003) (finding sentence of twenty-five years to life for 
stealing a set of golf clubs, when defendant had four prior convictions, did not violate 
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the Court has slowly carved proportionality into otherwise rigid legislative 
formulations in death penalty and certain juvenile cases.  Those opinions 
contain provocative references that, absent the categorical limitations, would 
appear to embrace the concept that mandatory sentencing is constitutionally 
flawed because it prohibits the defendant from offering evidence in mitigation 
of sentence.   
For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina, which struck down manda-
tory death for first-degree murder, the Court wrote that the statute offended 
the Constitution because:  
[The statute] accords no significance to relevant facets of the character 
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances [of the 
crime, and] exclude[ed] from consideration . . . the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.  It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not 
as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, 
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the pen-
alty of death.47   
Miller catalogues a robust list of considerations that mandatory schemes, like 
the mandatory life without parole sentence, prohibit: 
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration 
of his chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, im-
maturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequenc-
es.  It prevents taking into account the family and home environment 
that surrounds him . . . no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.  It ne-
glects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent 
of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pres-
sures may have affected him . . . .  [T]his mandatory punishment dis-
regards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances 
most suggest it.”48 
The spirit animating Woodson and Miller echoes § 3553(a) inquiries   
into circumstances of the offense and offender.  The force of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor’s endorsement of individualization and proportionality notwith-
standing, and whether (or to what extent) the Court is willing to extend or 
shade the lines drawn in the death and juvenile cases in a way that            
undermines mandatory schemes for other groups of individuals and for other 
outcomes, the end of mandatory sentencing – assuming Ewing and Harmelin 
  
the Eighth Amendment); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming 
fifty-years to life sentence for stealing videotapes by a defendant with three          
prior convictions).  
 47. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 48. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
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hold – is likely not found in the courts.49  As has been pointed out repeat- 
edly by the Court, establishing the limits of sentencing is first a matter          
of legislative prerogative; absent a finding that the system violates the Consti-
tution, it could be a long slog.  Thus, “significant reform will come, if at all, 
by Congress.”50 
With a couple of notable exceptions, the harms caused by mandatory 
minimums, the injustices they impose, and their failure to achieve the out-
comes they were adopted to meet have not swayed lawmakers enough to take 
the steps necessary to end or ameliorate mandatory sentencing or to embrace 
proportionality as described by Justice Sotomayor.  Proportionality qua pro-
portionality, even if a value in the abstract, is not a value shared by most fed-
eral lawmakers considering sentencing and mandatory minimums.  And the 
ode to proportionality and individualized sentencing that is the Miller deci-
sion is unlikely to move federal lawmakers to go “soft on crime.” 
And yet, the need for proportionality in sentencing has never been  
greater.  I believe the key to elevating proportionality to a value lawmakers 
will embrace will be found in one of the chief harms caused by the rise of 
mandatory minimums: the explosive growth of the federal prison population 
and the pressure it exerts on the DOJ’s budget.  
IV.  GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION51 
One of the byproducts of mandatory minimum sentencing is the tremen-
dous prison growth that has occurred during the last twenty-five years.52  
While budgets were expanding and money for prisons was not an issue, so 
  
 49. See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 45 (discussing how Harmelin, Ewing, Graham 
and Miller do not provide a comprehensive principle but notes how the juvenile cases 
“may provide a basis for relief for various specific categories of adult” LWOP of-
fenders); see also Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2010) (“In reality . . . the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area, described by some as an abandonment of the field, makes clear that judicial 
review will not provide much of a check on excessive punishment.”). 
 50. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 29.  
 51. In Parts IV, V and VI of this Article, I build on ideas I have presented else-
where in other forms. Letter in Response to a Request for Pub. Comment from Julie 
Stewart, President & Mary Price, Vice President, Families Against Mandatory     
Minimums, to Judge Patti B. Saris 2 (July 15, 2013) [hereinafter Request for        
Public Comment], available at http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/  
07/FAMM-commission-comments-DR.pdf.  In doing so, I have periodically adopted 
or closely paraphrased statements I have made before. In an effort to avoid burdening 
the text with unnecessary quotation marks, I have included footnotes noting where 
these similarities arise and also included references to the original source material for 
these propositions.  
 52. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2013) 
[hereinafter CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.  
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called “tough on crime” lawmakers found it expedient to pass criminal stat-
utes with mandatory minimums.  While some of these politicians genuinely 
believed that rigid sentences would deter criminals and keep our communities 
safer, it became too easy to score political points by seizing on the crime du 
jour to support adopting a new mandatory minimum.  Mandatory minimums 
were “frequently the result of floor amendments to demonstrate emphatically 
that legislators want to ‘get tough on crime.’”53  Other lawmakers describe a 
more principled, but evidence-light, process.  For example, former Repre-
sentative Dan Lungren, a republican from California, recently reflected on the 
dramatic escalation of the crack cocaine mandatory minimum by the House 
of Representatives in 1986: “We initially came out of committee with a 20-to-
1 ratio.  By the time we finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1.  We didn't real-
ly have an evidentiary basis for it, but that's what we did, thinking we were 
doing the right thing at the time.”54 
While experts may disagree about whether mandatory minimums made 
us safer,55 they have created other pressures that threaten public safety.    
Today, the costs of such policies are keenly felt as the need to maintain and 
increase prison spending eats into other budgets, including those allocated  
for law enforcement.  The DOJ, long a proponent of mandatory sen-        
tencing, began to sound the alarm several years ago.  In speeches and submis-
sions to Congress and the Commission, the DOJ and its representatives   
highlighted the increasing share of the Department’s budget dedicated to 
funding federal prisons.56 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is currently operating at 36% 
above rated capacity.57  The Inspector General of the DOJ (IG) bluntly rates 
  
 53. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 24 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Lunch-
eon Address (June 18, 1993), in U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA 287 (1993)).  
 54. Congressional Record, 111th Cong. H 6202 (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r111:7:./temp/~r111M9LunZ:e60208.  
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72.  
 56. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51; see also id. at 2 n.2 (quoting 
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the National 
District Attorney’s Association Summer Conference  (July 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice. gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-120723.html (“[W]e 
must also recognize that a criminal justice system that spends disproportionately on 
prisons – at the expense of policing, prosecutions and recidivism-reducing programs – 
is unlikely to be maximizing public safety.”); see also Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector 
General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of 
Justice – 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 11, 2013, reissued Dec. 23, 2013) (citing the 
opinion of the Deputy Attorney General that the increasing cost of the prison system 
is “unsustainable.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/ oig/challenges/2013.htm#l. 
 57. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51 at 2 (citing Federal Bureau of 
Prisons FY 2014 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,  
Justice, Sci. & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong.     
4 (April 17, 2013) [hereinafter Samuels Statement] (statement of Charles E.        
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its outlook as “bleak: the BOP projects system-wide crowding to exceed 44% 
over rated capacity through 2018.”58  This problem has been long in the mak-
ing.  The number of federal prisoners has grown from roughly 25,000 in FY 
1980 to nearly 219,000 in FY 2012.59  Between FY 2000 and FY 2012, the 
annual per capita cost to incarcerate federal prisoners increased from $21,603 
to $29,207.60  The BOP’s budget grew accordingly, from $3.668 billion to 
$6.641 billion.61 
According to the IG, the budget pressures created by the bloated prison 
population are significant and can be traced in part to the increased numbers 
of prisoners entering the system: 
[T]he Department faces the challenge of addressing the growing cost 
of housing a continually growing and aging population of federal in-
mates and detainees.  The federal prison system is consuming an ever-
larger portion of the Department’s budget, making safe and secure in-
carceration increasingly difficult to provide, and threatening to force 
significant budgetary and programmatic cuts to other DOJ components 
in the near future.  In FY 2006, there were 192,584 inmates in BOP 
custody.  As of October 2012, the BOP reported 218,730 inmates in 
BOP custody, an increase of more than 13 percent.  Not surprisingly, 
these trends mirror the increased number of federal defendants sen-
tenced each year, which rose from approximately 60,000 in FY 2001 
to more than 86,000 in FY 2011, according to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission.62 
The IG anticipates that, absent a course change, the BOP’s 25% share of the 
FY 2013 DOJ budget will grow to 28% by 2018.63  
Notwithstanding these funding increases, overcrowding in the BOP con-
tinues and threatens the safety of prisoners and prison staff alike.  The current 
  
Samuels, Jr., Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons), available at http://appropriations. 
house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ap19-wstate-samuelsc-20130417.pdf  (describing a 
capacity of 129,000 and a prison population   of 176,000, which results in a capacity 
at 136%, and describing how medium  security prisons operate at 44% above capacity 
and high security prisons operate at 54% above capacity). 
 58. Horowitz, supra note 56.  
 59. CRS Report, supra note 52.  
 60. Id. at 15 tbl.1. 
 61. Id. at 12 fig.5.  
 62. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 2-3 (quoting Oversight of the 
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Sci. and 
Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 9 (March 14, 
2013) [hereinafter Horowitz March Statement] (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, 
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at: http://appropriations. 
house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ap19-wstate-horowitzm-20130314.pdf). 
 63. Horowitz, supra note 56. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/7
File: 10.Price.F Created on: 3/18/2014 5:32:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:48:00 PM 
2013] MILL(ER)ING MANDATORY MINIMUMS 1159 
inmate-to-staff ratio is five-to-one,64 and BOP Director Charles Samuels re-
cently testified about the dangers this situation poses.65  So critical is the need 
for staff and the concern about the impact of across-the-board automatic 
spending cuts, that the Attorney General asked Congress to permit the DOJ 
authority to reprogram funds from other DOJ components to the BOP.66  The 
request was approved and the DOJ reprogrammed $150 million to the BOP,67 
including approximately $90 million from the FBI.68  
However, reprogramming is unsustainable.  The IG warned Congress in 
early June 2013 that “continuing to spend more money each year to operate 
more federal prisons will require the Department to make cuts to other im-
portant areas of its operations.”69  The Urban Institute reported its assessment 
that “[i]n these fiscally lean times, funding the expanding BOP population 
crowds out other priorities, including federal investigators and prosecutors 
and support for state and local governments.”70  In other words, locking up 
criminals at current rates and sentences is threatening public safety.         
Conservatives, formerly supportive of mandatory sentencing and incarcera-
tion policies, have also begun to sound the alarm.  Reflecting on his own prior 
assessment that “the social benefits approximately equaled the costs of incar-
ceration,” influential economist Steven D. Levitt told the New York Times in 
December 2012, “I think we should be shrinking the prison population by at 
least one-third.”71  David Keene, past president of the National Rifle Associa-
tion, reflected in an op-ed supporting mandatory minimum reform that 
“spending too much on prisons skews state and federal budgetary priorities, 
  
 64. Horowitz March Statement, supra note 62, at 9. 
 65. Samuels Statement, supra note 57, at 4-5 (“[I]ncreases in both the inmate-to-
staff ratio and the rate of crowding at an institution (the number of inmates relative to 
the institution’s rated capacity) are related to increases in the rate of serious inmate 
assaults. An increase of one in an institution’s inmate-to-custody-staff ratio increases 
the prison’s annual serious assault rate by approximately 4.5 per 5,000 inmates.”). 
 66. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related 
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Con. 1 (June 6, 2013) (Statement 
of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the U.S.), available at http://www. appropria-
tions.senate.gov/ht-commerce.cfm?method=hearings.download&id=5c7116e8-9d3b-
4e21-9b2d-86b157adb140. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Federal Bureau of Prisons FY 2014 Budget Request: Hearing Before       
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on  
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Transcript of Testimony of 
Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 6 (April 17, 2013) 
(on file with author). 
 69. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 3 (quoting Horowitz June 
Statement, supra note 63, at 10). 
 70. SAMUELS, ET AL, supra note 2, at 14.  
 71. John Tierney, For Lesser Crimes, Rethinking Life Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/science/man-
datory-prison-sentences-face-growing-skepticism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
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taking funds away from things that are proven to drive crime even lower, 
such as increasing police presence in high-violence areas and providing drug 
treatment to addicts.”72 
V.  THE ROLE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL PRISON 
OVERCROWDING CRISIS 
The lengthening of prison sentences, spurred particularly by mandatory 
minimums, directly contributes to the increase in the federal prison popula-
tion.  A recent report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) places the 
blame for prison overcrowding and the budget crisis squarely on decisions by 
Congress and the Commission.73  The report identified four factors driving 
over-incarceration: (1) increased numbers of federal offenses subject to man-
datory minimums; (2) the growth in mandatory minimums, which has in turn 
led to increased sentencing ranges and lengths under the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines; (3) the growing number of federal offenses; and (4) the elimina-
tion of parole.74 
Similarly, the Urban Institute, in its recent study of the causes of over-
population in the BOP, concluded that policies affecting the front end of the 
sentencing process have had the greatest impact: 
More than 90 percent of BOP inmates are sentenced offenders, mostly 
for federal crimes.  The number and composition of offenders commit-
ted to federal prison result from the investigations pursued by law en-
forcement, cases accepted and charged by prosecutors, the dispositions 
of those cases, the proportion of convicted offenders that receive a 
term of imprisonment, and the imposed sentence . . . . It is the combi-
nation of the volume of admissions and sentence that drives the inmate 
population.  The length of stay is largely determined by the sentence 
imposed (informed by the relevant statutory penalties and federal sen-
tencing guidelines), and any subsequent sentence reductions that re-
lease inmates early.  Currently, few options for early release exist, and 
most federal offenders sentenced to prison serve at least 87.5 percent 
of their term of imprisonment . . . .75  
Mandatory minimums have played an important role in overall federal 
sentence length in three ways.  First, mandatory minimums are lengthy      
and have grown over the years.76  Second, sentencing guidelines for crimes 
  
 72. David Keene, Prison-Sentence Reform, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 24, 2013, 
4:00 AM), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349118/prison-
sentence-reform-david-keene.  
 73. See CRS Report, supra note 52.  
 74. Id. at 7. 
 75. SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-10. 
 76. CRS Report, supra note 52, at 8.  
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that carry mandatory minimums anchor sentence ranges to the minimums, 
and guideline ranges increase according to sentencing factors set out in       
the guidelines.77  Third, even for crimes for which there are no mandatory 
minimums, the longer sentences made necessary by such minimums       
nonetheless exert a gravitational pull, lifting up all guideline ranges in a paro-
dy of proportionality.78 
A.  Long and Longer Mandatory Minimums 
According to the CRS Report, 
Mandatory minimum penalties have contributed to federal prison pop-
ulation growth because they have increased in number, have been ap-
plied to more offenses, required longer terms of imprisonment, and are 
used more frequently than they were 20 years ago. . . . Not only has 
there been an increase in the number of federal offenses that carry a 
mandatory minimum penalty, but offenders who are convicted of of-
fenses with mandatory minimums are being sent to prison for longer 
periods.  For example, the [U.S. Sentencing Commission or] USSC 
found that, compared to FY1990 (43.6%), a larger proportion of de-
fendants convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum 
penalty in FY2010 (55.5%) were convicted of offenses that carried a 
mandatory minimum penalty of five years or more.79  
Mandatory minimums have increased in number, length, and coverage.  
Between 1991 and 2011, the number of mandatory minimums doubled from 
98 to 195.80  They were added to more offenses, including child pornography 
crimes and aggravated identity theft, though drug and weapons offenses make 
up the greatest proportion of mandatory minimum bearing convictions.81  In 
addition, not only are mandatory minimums increasing in number but prose-
cutors are securing convictions that carry longer minimums.  In 1990, roughly 
half of defendants were convicted of a crime subject to a mandatory mini-
mum penalty, and 34.4% of those defendants were convicted of a crime sub-
ject to a ten-year mandatory minimum.82  By 2010, five-year convictions had 
fallen to 39.9% but ten-year convictions had grown to 40.7%;83 defendants 
  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 71-72.  
 81. Id. at 72-73.  In fiscal year 2010, 77.2% of defendants convicted of violating 
a statute carrying a mandatory minimum penalty were convicted of a drug trafficking 
offense (down from 91.1% in 1991), and 11.9% (up from 4.5% in 1991) were con-
victed of a firearms offense.  Id. at 73.  
 82. Id. at 75.  
 83. Id.  
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subject to mandatory minimums of greater than ten years increased as well, 
from 9.0% to 11.9%.84 
The number of defendants sentenced to mandatory minimums has in-
creased as well, from 6,681 in 1990 to 19,896 in 2010.85  Over this period, 
people serving mandatory minimums accumulated in the federal system.  On 
September 30, 2010, 75,579 (39%) of the 191,757 offenders in BOP custody 
were serving mandatory minimum sentences.86  And the sentences they were 
serving were longer as well.  In 2010, the average mandatory minimum sen-
tence imposed was 139 months, in contrast to forty-eight months for all of-
fenses.87  Even at 2010 prices, the cost is staggering.  If the cost of incarcera-
tion remained constant, we would pay $5,627,416,473.60 for the 19,896 peo-
ple sentenced to mandatory minimums in 2010.88 
B.  Sentencing Guidelines Anchored to Mandatory Minimums 
A little more than 60% of prisoners incarcerated in 2010 were not serv-
ing mandatory minimum sentences; they were serving sentences arrived at by 
using the federal Sentencing Guidelines.89  The majority of the guidelines for 
offenses covered by mandatory minimums are anchored by mandatory mini-
mums.  And while the guidelines themselves are no longer mandatory, judges 
are obliged to first calculate the applicable sentencing guideline before mov-
ing to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) inquiry.90  In 2012, 84.5% of sentences fell 
within or above the guidelines, or only fell below them due to a government 
motion or a guidelines-sanctioned judicial departure.91  In 2012, judges sen-
  
 84. Id. at 76. 
 85. Id. at 76, fig.4.7. 
 86. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 4 (citing 2011 MANDATORY 
MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 148). 
 87. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 136). 
 88. This is based on the average cost of incarceration in federal prison in 2010 
($28,284.16 according to the Administrative Office of the Courts), the average length 
of the sentence of 11.58 years (reduced to approximately ten years for good time); see 
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)) for the 19,896 people sentenced to mandatory minimums that 
year.  Ad. Office of the U.S. Courts, Newly Available: Costs of Incarceration and 
Supervision in FY 2010, THE THIRD BRANCH (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-23/Newly_Available_Costs_of_ 
Incarceration_and_Supervision_in_FY_2010.aspx.   
 89. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 140. 
 90. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 4 (citing Gall v. United 
States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007)). 
 91. Id. at 5 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl.N (2013) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK], 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_ 
Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm).  
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tenced within the applicable guidelines in over 82% of cases, indicating the 
guidelines’ continuing influence over sentencing.92 
Until 2009, drug trafficking convictions comprised the largest percent-
age of the federal criminal docket for a number of years.93  The Commission, 
in drafting the drug guideline, chose to link it to the five- and ten-year manda-
tory minimum sentences set by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.94           
The drafters set the corresponding starting points to hover slightly above     
the mandatory minimums.95  For example, a drug quantity that triggers a 
mandatory minimum of five years is assigned a guideline offense level that 
begins with sixty-three months, and the drug quantity that triggers the ten-
year mandatory minimum is set at 121 months for guideline purposes.96  This 
was done to provide some assistance to prosecutors seeking incentives for 
plea negotiations.97  The Commission then arranged drug quantities around 
those anchor points, spreading drug sentencing base offense levels across 
seventeen guideline ranges.98  Because the mandatory minimums served as 
the floor – or more appropriately, the basement – for the corresponding sen-
tencing guidelines, “all sentences for that crime, regardless of the circum-
stances of the crime or the offender, are arrayed above . . . .” them.99  Accord-
ing to the Commission,  
no other decision of the Commission has had such a profound impact 
on the federal prison population.  The drug trafficking guideline that 
ultimately was promulgated, in combination with the relevant conduct 
rule . . . had the effect of increasing prison terms far above what had 
been typical in past practice, and in many cases above the level re-
quired by the literal terms of the mandatory minimum statutes.100 
These choices were not only unprecedented; they were uncalled for.  
The Commission acknowledged that in crafting guidelines it has choices 
  
 92. Id.  
 93. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 152; see also Request 
for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9. 
 94. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9 (citing UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING 49 (Nov. 2004) 
[hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_ 
and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/index.cfm).  
 95. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.  
 96. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 94, at 49.  
 97. See id. at 77.  
 98. Id. at 49.  
 99. Mandatory Minimums: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 111th 
Cong. 8 (May 27, 2010) (Statement of James E. Felman, on behalf of the American 
Bar Association), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/ 
Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/Testimony_Felman_ABA.pdf.  
 100. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 9 (quoting FIFTEEN YEAR 
REPORT, supra note 94, at 49). 
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when indexing them to mandatory minimums.  It explained in 2009 that, 
when faced with drafting guidelines for an offense that includes a mandatory 
minimum, it has four choices. Its first choice is to set the base offense level – 
which is the starting point for determining the guideline sentencing range for 
the offense – so it exceeds the mandatory minimum.  This is how the drug 
guidelines generally are handled, as discussed immediately above.  Second, it 
is able to set the base offense level so that the mandatory minimum is con-
tained within the corresponding guideline range.  This is how crack cocaine 
was handled for a brief period; the mandatory minimum for crack cocaine 
was five years for an offense involving five grams, but the guideline assigned 
a corresponding base offense level of 24, with a guideline range of 51 to 63 
months.  Third, it can set the corresponding base offense level below the 
mandatory minimum and, if necessary, rely on specific enhancements to 
achieve a mandatory minimum sentence.  Finally, it can set the base offense 
level without regard to the mandatory minimum.101  The Commission has on 
occasion crafted or amended guidelines with corresponding mandatory mini-
mums using all four methods,102 but the drug guidelines – with a couple of 
notable exceptions103 – include base offense levels higher than the otherwise 
applicable mandatory minimum.  Practitioners and experts have urged the 
Commission to end the practice.104 
  
 101. Id. at 10 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 45-46 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
HISTORY] available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Pro-
jects/Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf.  
 102. Id. (citing U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a) (2012) (setting 
base offense levels for trafficking in child pornography below the mandatory mini-
mum and including enhancements that can increase the sentence to or above it); see 
also CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 101 at 46-49; U.S SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2012) (assessing a two-level enhancement when 
a gun is possessed by a defendant in connection with a drug trafficking offense, not-
withstanding the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(2012) for a conviction of possessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 
offense); U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(E) (2012) (assigning a 
weight for  marijuana plants of 100 grams rather than the statutory assessment of 
1000 grams per plant in 21 U.S.C. §. 841(b)(1)(A)(vii)); U.S SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(G) (2012) (subtracting the weight of the carrier medi-
um  from the weight of LSD calculated under the guidelines and assigning each dose 
of LSD a uniform weight, in contrast to 21 U.S.C. §. 841(b)(1)(A)(v) which weighs 
the entire dose, including the carrier medium).  
 103. See supra note 102 (discussing the calculation of LSD carrier mediums and 
marijuana plants).  
 104. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 10.  The Request for Public 
Comment provides recent examples.  Id. at 10 n.40 (Letter from Julie Stewart and 
Mary Price (FAMM) to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 15-16  
(July 23, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_ 
Comment/20120815/FAMM_priorities_comment.pdf (urging across the board two-
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Anchoring the guidelines in this fashion has had profound consequenc-
es.  Today, nearly half of all federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug of-
fenses – half of whom are first time offenders – and are serving sentences 
that, while falling, still averaged sixty-eight months in 2012.105  The Urban 
Institute’s recent study of the factors that have increased the BOP population 
found that “the growth in the BOP population from 1998 to 2010 confirmed 
that time served in prison, particularly for drug offenses, was the largest de-
terminant of the growth in the population.”106  Time served for those offend-
ers is inextricably linked to the mandatory minimum sentences on which the 
guidelines are based.    
 
C.  Faux Proportionality: Mandatory Minimums and Guidelines  
Associated with Them Encourage the Upward Ratchet in Guideline  
Sentences for Other Offenses 
Several observers have noted that mandatory minimums and the guide-
lines linked to them have lifted – or been cited in support of lifting – other 
guideline-based sentences, including those not associated with mandatory 
minimums.  The CRS recently found:  
 
While only offenders convicted for an offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty are subject to those penalties, mandatory minimum 
penalties have, in effect, increased sentences for other offenders.  The 
USSC has incorporated many mandatory minimum penalties into the 
sentencing guidelines, which means that penalties for other offense 
categories under the guidelines had to increase in order to keep a sense 
of proportionality.107 
 
This sham proportionality has operated in only one direction, prompting the 
Judicial Conference’s Criminal Law Committee to chide the Commission for 
  
level reduction of drug base offense levels); JASMINE TYLER, DRUG POLICY 
ALLIANCE, PUBLIC COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION REGARDING PROPOSED PRIORITIES FOR 2013 4-5 (July 31, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20120815/ 
DPA_priorities_comment.pdf (arguing for a reduction of all drug sentencing guide-
lines by two levels); Letter from Marjorie E. Meyers to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3-5 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www. 
ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/Defender-Priorites-
Comments_2011-2012.pdf; Letter from Marc Mauer to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1-2 (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/SentencingProject_Pub
Comm_2012_priorities.pdf.  
 105. SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. E, table 14).  
 106. Id.  
 107. CRS Report, supra note 52, at 8. 
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addressing proportionality concerns by increasing penalties.108  In a letter to 
the Commission, Judge Sim Lake, chair of the Criminal Law Committee, 
stated, “The Committee believes that the goal of proportionality should not 
become a one-way ratchet for increasing sentences. . . .”109   
However, the Commission is not entirely to blame; Congress also 
played a role.  For example, when the guidelines for certain economic crimes 
were reconsidered following the collapse of Enron and the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “the ‘penalty gap’ between fraud and drug cases was 
used to pressure the Commission to amend U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 
2B1.1.”110  With Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress raised the statutory maximum for 
certain offenses and directed the Commission to respond quickly.111  The 
Commission – with the assistance of practitioners, the judiciary, the DOJ, law 
professors, and probation officers – had just two years earlier capped a five-
year process of study and drafting to produce the 2001 Economic Crime 
Package.112  Nonetheless, it held hearings to consider additional amendments 
made necessary by Sarbanes-Oxley.113  All witnesses, save the DOJ, opposed 
general increases, which the Commission was resistant to as well.114  Senator 
Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Crime and Drugs, was not content to leave the Commission to its own devic-
es.115  His committee held several hearings, including one in the summer of 
2002 entitled “Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?”116  
Shortly before the Commission’s April 2003 meeting to vote on whether and 
how much to amend the guidelines, Senator Biden  “inserted into the Con-
gressional Record a ‘legislative history’ of Title IX of Sarbanes-Oxley which 
suggested quite plainly that Senator Biden wanted an across-the-board guide-
line increase for economic crimes.”117  He wrote: 
  
 108. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 5. 
 109. Letter from Hon. Sim Lake, Chair of the Judicial Conference Comm. on 
Criminal Law, to Members of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2004) (on 
file with the author). 
 110. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 53 n.65.  
 111. Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History 
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
373, 411 (2004).  
 112. Id. at 388-90. 
 113. Id. at 431. 
 114. Id.  
 115. See id.  
 116. See Penalties for White Collar Crime Offenses: Are We Really Getting 
Tough on Crime?: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1-17 (2002), reprinted in 15 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 234 (2003).  
 117. Bowman, supra note 111, at 431. 
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Congress in particular is concerned about base offense levels which 
may be too low.  The increased sentences, while mean[ing] to punish 
the most egregious offenders more severely, are also intended to raise 
sentences at the lower end of the sentencing guidelines.  While Con-
gress acknowledges that the Sentencing Commission’s recent amend-
ments are a step in the right direction, the Commission is again di-
rected to consider closely the testimony adduced at the hearings by the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs respecting the ongoing 
“penalty gap” between white-collar and other offenses.  To the extent 
that the “penalty gap” existed, in part, by virtue of higher sentences for 
narcotics offenses, for example, Congress responded by increasing 
sentences for certain white-collar offenses.  Accordingly, we ask the 
Commission to consider the issues raised herein; determine if adjust-
ments are warranted in light of the enhanced penalty provisions con-
tained in this title; and make recommendations accordingly.118 
This perversion of overall sentencing “proportionality” has had an im-
pact.  Sentence lengths for economic crime offenses have risen dramatically 
and particularly for high-end loss crimes, because – like the drug guidelines 
that Senator Biden asked the Commission to emulate, which are based on 
drug quantities – the fraud guideline is dominated by the loss table, which 
increases with the amount of loss or intended loss.119  Sentences for serious 
fraud offenses increased from an average of eighty-nine months in 2004 to 
123 months in 2011.120   
This sentence escalation has attracted a lot of attention.  One judge 
commented that “we now have an advisory guideline[] regime where . . . any 
officer or director of virtually any public corporation who has committed 
securities fraud will be confronted with a guideline calculation either calling 
for or approaching lifetime imprisonment.”121  Professor Frank Bowman, a 
former federal prosecutor, concluded that the “rules governing high-end fed-
eral white-collar sentences are now completely untethered from both criminal 
law theory and common sense.”122  The result is counterproductive as judges 
  
 118. Id. (citing 149 Cong. Rec. S5328 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of 
Senator Joseph Biden)). 
 119. David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, “Losing Ground” in Search of a Rem-
edy for the Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing 
Guidelines for Fraud and Theft, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 142 (2011). 
 120. The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six 
Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5-6 (Testimony of 
James E. Felman on Behalf of the American Bar Association) (2011), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Felman%2010112011.pdf. 
 121. U.S. v. Parris, 573 F.Supp.2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 122. Frank O. Bowman, Sacrificial Felon: Life Sentences for Marquee White 
Collar Criminals Don’t Make Sense, AM. LAW., Jan 2007, at 63.  
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vote with their variances123 from the guidelines and express themselves in 
scathing opinions calling the guidelines “patently absurd on their face,”124 “a 
black stain on common sense,”125 and, ultimately, “of no help.”126  
D.  The Threat of New Mandatory Minimums or Mandatory Guidelines 
In recent years, the DOJ and some members of Congress have suggested 
that Congress adopt new mandatory minimums in order to ensure that sen-
tences – especially in the economic crime arena, where variances have in-
creased – be stabilized.  Testifying before the Commission about mandatory 
minimums in 2010, the DOJ acknowledged the “heavy price” extracted by 
mandatory minimums, decried the growth in the BOP, but then announced it 
was carefully considering asking Congress to impose new mandatory sen-
tences for certain white collar offenses.127  A few months later, the U.S. At-
torney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, also endorsed 
the idea of so-called “modest mandatory minimums,” stating that “there are 
not that many mandatory minimums in the white collar context.  Perhaps 
there should be.”128  By September 2011, the DOJ reiterated its call for a re-
view but appeared to have abandoned its concern that white collar sentencing 
practices require mandatory sentences, calling instead for specific enhance-
ments in key areas.129  Meanwhile, in early 2011, Senator Charles Grassley 
urged Congress to revisit the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines, 
decrying variances in economic crime sentencing and raising the alarm:  
  
 123. The average minimum sentenced called for in the fraud guideline has more 
than doubled since 1996, and judges have responded by reducing fraud sentences on 
average 52.8% below the guideline minimum (the largest judge-led reductions for any 
guideline offense).  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING 
IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 67, 92 (2012) avail-
able at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congress-ional_Test-
imony_ and_Reports/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/index.cfm.    
 124. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).   
 125. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 754. 
 126. United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010).   
 127. Mandatory Minimums: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 111th 
Cong. 24, 26-27  (May 27, 2010) (Testimony of Sally Quillian Yates on behalf of the 
Department of Justice), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/Hearing_Transcript.pdf.   
 128. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, United States 
Sentencing Commission, 111th Cong. 60 (February 16, 2011) (Testimony of Preet 
Bharara), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Hearing_Transcript.pdf. 
 129. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of J. and Jonathan 
J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legis., to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. 
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[C]riminal fraud will not be adequately deterred unless we revisit the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker. . . .  Now that 
the Guidelines have been held to be merely advisory, the disparity and 
unfairness in judicially imposed sentences that we sought to eliminate 
on a bipartisan basis are returning, especially in two areas: child por-
nography and fraud cases of the type we are discussing today.  If po-
tential fraudsters view the lenient sentences now being handed down 
as merely a cost of doing business, efforts to combat criminal fraud 
could be undermined.130 
The Commission is very sensitive to signals from the DOJ and Congress 
and, to some extent, sees its role as ensuring that guideline sentences are ap-
propriately severe so that they will secure approval from Congress, which can 
disapprove a guideline amendment.  Congress has indicated its interest in 
severity either by directly amending the guidelines, as it did with the 
PROTECT Act of 2003,131 or directing the Commission to do so.132 
VI.  PROPORTIONATE SENTENCES ARE SHORTER  
AND SAFER SENTENCES 
Tackling over-incarceration could be a relatively straightforward task.  
Indeed, there have been a variety of proposals over the years to lessen the 
pressure on the federal prison population by designing mechanisms aimed at 
releasing some prisoners early.133  However, these mechanisms have not 
gained traction.  While such efforts to secure these so-called “back-end fixes” 
are commendable, unless we abate the flow of prisoners into the system at the 
  
 130. Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing 
Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 131. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, Pub.L. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered 
section of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.) Section 104 of the PROTECT Act 
included a directive to the Commission to amend the guidelines to include specified 
enhancements. 
 132. NATIONAL FEDERAL DEFENDER RESOURCE COUNSEL, CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTIVES TO THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1988 – 2013 1 (Nov. 2013), available 
at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/SRC-directives-Table-Novem-
ber-2011.pdf.  
 133. See, e.g., The Second Chance Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1231, 112th 
Cong. § 4 (providing for increased good time and earned good time credits); see also 
The Literacy, Education and Rehabilitation Act, H.R. 3602, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(providing for credit toward completion of sentence for prisoners participating in 
programming); The Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2013, 
H.R. 62, 113th Cong. (providing for release after 50% of the sentence served for eli-
gible prisoners).  
23
Price: Price: Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File:Price – Final Formatting 3/9/14 Created on:  3/18/2014 5:32:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:48:00 PM 
1170 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
front end and address the length of time they are sentenced to serve, we are 
simply bailing out the overflowing bathtub without turning off the tap.  
However straightforward, tackling the over-incarceration problem will 
require a paradigm shift by lawmakers.  Since the mid-1980s, our criminal 
justice approach has been to incarcerate our way to safety.  Over the years, 
observers have criticized mandatory sentencing schemes as unjust, ineffec-
tive, harmful to communities and families, expensive, and rife with unintend-
ed consequences.134  A number of experts have examined the impact that 
lowering prison terms and diverting some low-level prisoners away from 
incarceration might have on public safety.  They found that shortening the 
length of time prisoners serve and the rate at which they are released does not 
bear on the likelihood of recidivism.135  In other words, according to criminal 
justice experts we can shorten prison sentences without compromising public 
safety.136  Today, however, we are at a new juncture; unless we reduce the 
number of people in prison, our addiction to incarceration could endanger 
public safety.137  
Fortunately, “reducing mass incarceration is conceptually simple: We 
need to send fewer people to prison and for shorter lengths of time.”138  While 
lawmakers have some control over how many people are sent to prison, that 
control is rather indirect; it stems from the number and nature of the criminal 
laws Congress passes or repeals.  On the other hand, Congress has a much 
more direct path to addressing mass incarceration: addressing the sentences 
called for when our laws are broken.  Certainly Congress could reduce or 
even eliminate all mandatory minimum sentences and direct the Commission 
to amend the guidelines to make corresponding changes.  Such dramatic leg-
islation would undoubtedly result in lower sentences because judges would be 
able to use the advisory guideline system to fashion individualized, propor-
tionate sentences.   
We know that requiring proportionate sentences frequently leads to 
shorter sentences.  Given the opportunity to fashion a sentence based not only 
on the offense and aggravating circumstances but also on an individual’s 
characteristics and influences, judges tend to impose lower sentences.  For 
example, consider the federal safety valve; champions of the five- and ten-
year mandatory minimums for drug crimes intended that they be imposed on 
“major” and “serious” drug traffickers:  
  
 134. See 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8, at 90-110 (summa-
rizing views, litigation and resolutions); 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 90-104 (the same), Appendix J (summarizing testimony to Commission). 
 135. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: 
Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 
309-11 (2009).  
 136. Id. 
 137. See, supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. 
 138. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Re-
ducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 297 (2013). 
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For the kingpins – the masterminds who are really running these oper-
ations – and they can be identified by the amount of drugs with which 
they are involved – we require a jail term upon conviction.  If it is 
their first conviction, the minimum term is 10 years . . . .  Our proposal 
would also provide mandatory minimum penalties for the middle-level 
dealers as well.  Those criminals would also have to serve time in jail.  
The minimum sentences would be slightly less than those for the 
kingpins, but they nevertheless would have to jail – a minimum of 5 
years for the first offense.139 
Following the enactment of drug-related mandatory minimum           
sentences in the mid-1980s, it became apparent that the harsh, one-size-fits-
all sentences for drug offenders reached well beyond the “major” and       
“serious” drug traffickers their champions cited.  The Commission reported  
to Congress in 1991 that the mandatory minimums did a poor job of         
meeting the expectations that prompted them.140  One particular criticism 
addressed the failure of the sentences to distinguish culpability or to guaran-
tee proportional sentences: 
By requiring the same sentence for defendants who are markedly dis-
similar in their level of participation in the offense and in objective in-
dications of post-offense reform, these mandatory minimum provi-
sions . . . short-circuit the guidelines’ design of implementing sentenc-
es that seek to be proportional to the defendant’s level of culpability 
and need for punishment.141  
The release of the Commission’s report prompted Congress to rethink 
the reach of drug-related mandatory minimums.  While the Senate debated a 
harsh new crime bill to ensure life sentences for certain offenders, increase 
penalties for use of a firearm in commission of a drug trafficking crime, and 
implement other tough on crime measures, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch 
discussed amending the criminal code to ensure some flexibility in sentencing 
for first-time offenders: 
I have talked with judges all over this country, and they have all indi-
cated to me, most all have indicated to me – and I do not know of any 
  
 139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 6-7 
(2002) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 27,193-94 (Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Robert 
Byrd)) available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congress-
ional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Polic
y/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; see also id. at 7 n.21 (citing 
132 CONG. REC. 22, 993 (Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (“[S]eparate 
penalties are established for the biggest traffickers, with another set of penalties for 
other serious drug pushers.”). 
 140. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 8, at 33-34.   
 141. Id. at 28. 
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objections – that they need more flexibility in some of these cases be-
cause the mandatory minimums are resulting in injustices.  So this 
amendment will bring a greater measure of credibility to our criminal 
justice system.  I can think of no issue more vital to our national inter-
est than the control of drug abuse and violent crime.  The Hatch 
amendment, which, of course, includes the Gramm amendments, will 
help restore credibility in our criminal justice system by ensuring that 
violent offenders and recidivists will face enhanced mandatory mini-
mum sentences, by returning a measured degree of discretion to the 
courts in cases involving first-time, nonviolent drug offenders.142  
Congress adopted a safety valve very similar to the one proposed by Senator 
Hatch in 1994.  It applies in drug trafficking cases only and directs the court 
to waive the mandatory minimum sentence if the court finds the defendant 
meets certain statutory criteria.143  At least 80,000 defendants have benefitted 
from this safety valve since its adoption.144   
The safety valve directs judges to use the advisory guidelines to impose 
a sentence.  As discussed in Part II above, sentencing under the advisory 
guidelines involves not only a calculation of the applicable guideline        
sentence, but also a comprehensive and individualized inquiry into the nature 
of the offense, the characteristics and history of the defendant, and the impo-
sition of a sentence no greater than necessary.  In other words, once freed 
from the grip of mandatory sentencing, judges are obliged to conduct an indi-
vidualized inquiry, resulting in a sentence proportioned to both the offense 
and offender. 
Such proportionality saves money and bed spaces.  In 2010 alone, of  
the 15,257 people convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory min-
imum sentence, 5,539 received the safety valve.145  That year, defendants 
who remained subject to the mandatory minimum and did not receive         
the benefit of the safety valve – or a substantial assistance motion by the 
  
 142. 139 Cong. Rec. S 15257, 1993 WL 455658 (Nov. 8, 1993) (statement of 
Senator Orrin Hatch) [hereinafter Hatch Statement].  
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (stating that the court may waive the mandatory mini-
mum and sentence the defendant using the federal Sentencing Guidelines if it finds 
that the defendant has no or very limited criminal history; did not use or threaten 
violence or possess a firearm; that the offense did not result in death or serious bodily 
injury; that the defendant was not the organizer or leader and the defendant truthfully 
provided the government all information concerning the offense or related offenses). 
 144. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, SAFETY VALVES IN A NUTSHELL 
2 (July 7, 2012), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FS% 
20Safety%20valves%20in%20a%20nutshell%206.27.12.pdf.  
 145. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 7 (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 113 tbl.44 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_ 
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table44.pdf).  
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prosecutor146 – were sentenced to an average of 132 months.147  In contrast, 
defendants who received safety valve relief received average sentences of 
forty-nine months,148 an eighty-three month difference.  What is unknowable 
from the available statistics is what sentence those 5,539 safety valve defend-
ants would have received had they not been safety valve eligible.  We can 
expect that they would have been sentenced to terms shorter than the 132 
month average.  This is because defendants eligible for the safety valve are 
less culpable than other defendants and, while they would have been subject 
to the mandatory minimum, their sentences would not have been enhanced 
for possession of weapons, significant criminal history, or for being a leader 
or organizer.149  In other words, more culpable defendants are not eligible for 
the safety valve and are thus are more likely on average to receive higher 
sentences, enhanced even above the applicable mandatory minimum.   
That said, the savings in bed space and money cannot help but be signif-
icant.150  Assuming those 5,539 defendants saw their sentences reduced by 
only twelve months from the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum, the 
overall savings is 5,539 prison years.151  Today, it costs the BOP on average 
$28,893.40 per year to incarcerate a federal prisoner.152  The BOP estimates, 
however, that because many of the costs of housing prisoners are fixed costs 
related to maintain facilities, the average savings of decreasing a prison popu-
lation by a single prisoner is $10,362.153  Using that figure,  the safety valve 
savings generated in 2010 would be at least $57,400,657.  Unfortunately, the 
safety valve only applies to drug defendants and only to a subset of those who 
meet the narrow criteria. 
Similarly, lowering mandatory minimums reduces time in prison.  The 
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA)154 affected both sentence 
length and the number of people subject to mandatory minimums for crack 
cocaine.  The reform raised the triggering quantities for crack cocaine manda-
tory minimums from five grams to twenty-eight grams for the five-year man-
datory minimum and from fifty grams to 280 grams for the ten-year penal-
ty.155  In 2012, the 3,388 defendants sentenced for crack cocaine received 
average sentences of ninety-seven months, which is fourteen months shorter 
  
 146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 147. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 7 (citing 2011 MANDATORY 
MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 161). 
 148. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 161). 
 149. Id. (citing 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 4, at 137). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 8. 
 152. Id. (citing Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 16711-02 (Mar. 18, 2013)). 
      153. Samuels, et al. supra note 105 at 13. 
 154. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 
844, 960). 
 155. Id.  
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than the pre-FSA crack sentences.156  Savings generated that year were 
$40,362,425. 
Lowering crack cocaine sentences and raising the triggering quantities 
for the mandatory minimums has also had an impact on the number of people 
entering federal prison. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission reduced all 
crack cocaine guideline sentences by two levels and starting in 2008 the 
number of people prosecuted for crack cocaine offenses began to fall.157  The 
FSA continued the trend, exerting what seems to have been a calming effect 
on crack cocaine prosecutions.  While the number of people sentenced for all 
other drug offenses has risen since 2010,158 the number of individuals prose-
cuted for crack cocaine offenses fell.  While judges sentenced 4,742 defend-
ants for crack cocaine offenses in FY 2010, by 2012 the number had fallen to 
3,388.159  That is a 31% drop in successful crack cocaine prosecutions and 
represents $14,031,502 that we will not spend incarcerating low level crack 
cocaine offenders this year alone.  While there could have been a 30% drop in 
crack cocaine trafficking over those two years, it appears more likely that 
removing the incentive for prosecutors to go after such low-hanging fruit 
means they are redirected to more serious offenders, or at least to those drug 
offenders still generating lengthy sentences.  
VII.  WINNING OVER THE SKEPTICS: PROPORTIONALITY AND THE 
OLD TOUGH ON CRIME CROWD 
Mandatory minimum reform will not succeed unless it is bipartisan.  In 
these highly partisan times that sounds like a very tall order; however, both 
the safety valve adopted in 1994 and the FSA enjoyed bipartisan support.  
The FSA originated in the Senate and its original sponsors were Senator Dick 
Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, and Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of 
Alabama.  The bill passed in the Senate by unanimous consent and passed in 
  
 156. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at fig. J, available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/FigureJ.pdf. 
157 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENDERS, Fig. 2 
(Jan. 2014) available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20140109/Data-Presentation.pdf. 
 158. Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 145, at fig. J, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
0/FigureJ.pdf, with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at fig. J, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
2/FigureJ.pdf.  
 159. Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 145, at fig. J, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
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the House on a voice vote.160  Senator Hatch was key to ensuring the intro-
duction and passage of the safety valve in 1994.  Admittedly, neither the FSA 
nor the safety valve was prompted by concerns about mass incarceration, if 
transcripts of sponsor statements and floor speeches are any indication of 
what motivated sponsors and supporters,161 but both have had a profound 
impact on the ability of judges to assess more proportionate sentences. 
Those who have been working for sentencing reform for many years 
have a lot to feel optimistic about in the present political climate due to new 
partners from an unexpected quarter.  There is a vibrant conservative move-
ment for criminal justice reform.162  From the Heritage Foundation to the 
American Legislative Exchange Council, leaders of conservative thought and 
action are taking up criminal justice reform.163  Conservative activist Eli Leh-
rer calls this development “the most important social reform movement on 
the right since the rise of the pro-life movement of the 1970s.”164  
The movement drew motivation from creative work in red states where 
prisons were bloated by years of tough-on-crime policies and where budgets 
were blasted by the financial crisis.165  A number of those states have taken 
steps to cut spending on prisons.166  The new movement spawned “a sea 
change in conservative thinking” among “political leaders with rock-solid 
conservative credentials.”167   
Republican lawmakers and governors who once favored long sentences 
to control crime in states such as Texas, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky,          
South Carolina, and South Dakota are now leading a charge to “replace 
  
 160. See S. 1789, Bill Summary and Status, Major Congressional Actions, 111th 
Cong. (noting unanimous consent and the bi-partisan list of co-sponsors), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01789:@@@R.  
 161. See Hatch Statement, supra note 142 (remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch introduc-
ing Safety Valve amendment); see also CONG. REC., 111th Cong. H 6202 (July        
28, 2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r111:7:./temp/  
~r111M9 LunZ:e60208 (statement of Rep. Dan Lungren who noted, “Certainly, one 
of the sad ironies in this entire episode is that a bill which was characterized by some 
as a response to the crack epidemic in African American communities has led to ra-
cial sentencing disparities which simply cannot be ignored in any reasoned discussion 
of this issue.  When African Americans, low-level crack defendants, represent ten 
times the number of low-level white crack defendants, I don’t think we can simply 
close our eyes.”). 
 162. Request for Public Comment, supra note 51, at 5. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing Neil King, Jr., As Prisons Squeeze Budgets, GOP Rethinks Crime 
Focus, WALL STREET J., June 21, 2013, at A1, available at http://online. 
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323836504578551902602217018).  
 165. King, supra note 164. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Eli Lehrer, The Party of Prison Reform: Conservatives Lead the Way, THE 
WKLY. STANDARD (March 18, 2013) http://staging.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/ 
party-prison-reform_706676.html.  
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tough-on-crime dictums of the 1990s with a more forgiving and nuanced     
set of laws.”168  Over half of the nation’s states have begun to overhaul their 
criminal justice systems and the majority of those states are Republican-
led.169  This movement is producing results; according to the DOJ, state   
prison populations continued the decline begun in 2010 after peaking in 2009 
at 1.4 million.170   
Born of concerns over the excessive cost of incarceration, this move-
ment grafts traditional conservative principles and language onto a new    
approach to criminal justice.  Richard Viguerie, perhaps best known as the 
father of conservative direct mail fundraising, identifies the prison pop-
ulation crisis as symptomatic of errant big government, long a target of    
traditional conservatives.171  He argues that criminal justice spending ought  
to be subject to the same level of scrutiny as other government spending pro-
grams that conservatives like to decry.172  Viguerie does not stop there; pris-
ons, he says, harm families and prisoners – people who are deserving of  
compassion – while turning out prisoners who are more harmful to society  
for their stay.173  He further states that three principles: “public safety,     
compassion and controlled government spending – lie at the core of con-
servative philosophy.”174  
Meanwhile, the conservative organization Right on Crime brings to-
gether the cream of the crop in an effort to rethink and reshape approaches to 
crime and punishment.175  Right on Crime is the brainchild of the Texas Pub-
lic Policy Foundation, a conservative think tank that led the successful effort 
to stem the increase in prison construction in Texas starting in 2007,176 which 
many saw as the kick-off to state-led campaigns to stabilize or reduce incar-
ceration rates.177  Right on Crime’s organizing principles are:  
  
 168. King, supra note 164.  
 169. Id.; see also FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, TURNING OFF THE 
SPIGOT: HOW SENTENCING SAFETY VALVES CAN HELP STATES PROTECT PUBLIC 
SAFETY AND SAVE MONEY 13-18 (2013), available at http://www.famm.org/Repos-
itory/Files/Turning%20Off%20the%20Spigot%20web%20final.pdf (cataloguing state 
safety valve statutes).  
 170. E. ANNE  CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 
IN 2011 2 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.  
 171. Richard A. Viguerie, A Conservative Case for Prison Reform, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2013, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/a-
conservative-case-for-prison-reform.html. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. King, supra note 164. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id.; see also Viguerie, supra note 171.  
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grounded in time-tested conservative truths – constitutionally limited 
government, transparency, individual liberty, personal responsibility, 
free enterprise, and the centrality of the family and community.  All of 
these are critical to addressing today’s criminal justice challenges.  It 
is time to apply these principles to the task of delivering a better return 
on taxpayers’ investments in public safety.  Our security, prosperity, 
and freedom depend on it.178 
The tough-on-crime narrative is giving way to a more thoughtful, re-
sponsible approach to crime and punishment.  Mark Levin, policy director for 
Right on Crime, reflected recently that “[w]e don’t say conservatives were 
wrong in the 1980s and 1990s when they said ‘We need more prisons,’ . . . .  
But as we expanded incarceration, we’ve swept in a lot of low-risk offenders 
and spent a lot of money.”179  As conservatives find their footing in this new 
arena, they are beginning to make common cause with traditional criminal 
justice and prison reform supporters.  Noting this momentum, Michael Ger-
son, formerly of the Bush White House, welcomes the “odd, ideological coa-
lition that favors reform.”180  It includes liberals, libertarians, and evangeli-
cals, coming together to address what Gerson calls the “Hoover Dam of 
American social engineering: mass incarceration.”181   
This movement identifies with the growing sentiment to address the dual 
problems of over-federalization of crimes and over-criminalization of con-
duct.  This concern reaches from the advocacy community to Capitol Hill.  In 
the advocacy community, right-left coalitions such as the Heritage Founda-
tion’s Overcriminalization Working Group – which includes such heretofore 
odd bedfellows as the Federalist Society, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
FAMM, and the Cato Institute – meet monthly to share news and strategies to 
lessen the criminalization of conduct.182  Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill a Re-
publican-Democrat task force in the House of Representatives has held hear-
ings to help the members sort out and grapple with the inordinate number of 
crimes on the books and the tens of thousands of criminalized regulatory of-
  
 178. Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-
conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).  
 179. Lehrer, supra note 167.  
 180. Michael Gerson, Op-Ed., Mass Incarceration’s Tragic Success, WASH. POST, 
June 28, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mich-
ael-gerson-mass-incarcerations-tragic-success/2013/06/27/7eb62518-df5b-11e2-b2d4-
ea6d8f477a01_story.html. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-
Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.heri-
tage.org/research/testimony/2013/06/defining-the-problem-and-scope-of-overcrimin-
alization-and-overfederalization (statement of John G. Malcolm, discussing, inter alia,  
the Heritage Foundation’s Over-criminalization Working Group).  
31
Price: Price: Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File:Price – Final Formatting 3/9/14 Created on:  3/18/2014 5:32:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:48:00 PM 
1178 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
fenses.183  The task force is housed in the House Judiciary Committee, which 
has the reputation of being among the most bitterly partisan committees on 
the Hill.  The problem of harsh sentencing is inextricably linked with over-
federalization and over-incarceration.184  The link is simple: at the other end 
of every unnecessary federal criminal law is a federal criminal sentence, and 
most of those sentences result in incarceration.  Only 7.1% of the 83,443 peo-
ple sentenced for a federal crime in 2012 received a sentence of straight pro-
bation;185 of the remainder, 87.2% were sentenced to prison only.186    
Fortunately, nationally known conservatives are identifying mandatory 
minimums as a key criminal justice problem that the reform movement 
should embrace.  David Keene, former president of the National Rifle Asso-
ciation, observed: “Federal mandatory minimum laws are especially prob-
lematic.  Not only do they transfer power from independent courts to a politi-
cal executive [prosecutors], they also perpetuate the harmful trend of federal-
izing criminal activity that can better be prosecuted at the state level.”187  
Conservative commentator Eli J. Lehrer, leader of a free-market think tank 
and former Heritage Foundation fellow and speechwriter to Senator Bill 
Frist,188 attributes the current low crime rate to incarceration policies.  But in 
a recent piece, he sounded an alarm about the costs of these policies: 
Effective though mass incarceration is, however, the strategy is not 
without its costs.  These costs can be measured in fiscal terms, in the 
failure of imprisonment to prevent certain repeat behavior, in the im-
pact of incarceration on certain communities, and in the tension be-
tween high incarceration rates and democratic values.189 
He advocates for sharply shortened but swiftly applied mandatory minimum 
sentences, combined with substance abuse treatment and compelled work in 
harsh, but humane, settings.190 
The principle and practice of proportionate sentencing should inform 
any legislative reform in this area.  Proportionality can be an essential tool to 
ensure that prisons and lengthy terms of incarceration are reserved for those 
  
 183. See id. (additional statements are available at http://judiciary.house. 
gov/hearings/113th/hear_06142013.html). 
 184. See Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 24. 
 185. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at tbl. 12, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/201
2/Table12.pdf. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Keene, supra note 72.  
 188. Eli Lehrer, R STREET, http://www.rstreet.org/about/staff/eli-lehrer/.  
 189. Eli J. Lehrer, Responsible Prison Reform, NAT’L AFFAIRS (June 28,      
2010), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/responsible-
prison-reform.  
 190. Id.  
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offenders who deserve them.  Proportionality also serves conservative values 
of restraint in public spending and in restricting liberty by selecting for short-
er sentences people who do not need to serve longer ones by virtue of their 
culpability.  Providing for proportionality can help ensure that prisons are not 
filled with people who do not need to be there, and that funds are reserved for 
catching, prosecuting, and incarcerating the people who do need to be there. 
VIII.  PROPORTIONALITY AND MANDATORY MINIMUM REFORM 
While criminal justice reform swirls around the country, the federal 
prison system continues to grow and sentencing reform enjoys unprecedented 
bipartisan support.  Such reform will become necessary if the public safety 
threats of federal over-incarceration are to be averted.  Mandatory minimum 
sentencing must be part of the reform agenda and, short of repeal, helping 
judges bypass those sentences in favor of ones better tailored to culpability is 
a good start.  
The Commission advocates for limited mandatory minimum reforms, 
including safety valves, in its most recent report to Congress on the subject.  
The recommendations include, among others: (1) expanding the current safe-
ty valve so that it covers a few more drug offenders, and expanding it to pro-
vide relief to low-level, non-violent offenders subject to mandatory mini-
mums for other offenses; (2) lowering the mandatory sentence for two- and 
three-strike drug offenses; (3) lowering the twenty-five-year enhanced penal-
ty for second and subsequent convictions for possession of a firearm in con-
nection with a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and ensur-
ing that they are imposed only for prior convictions; and (4) giving judges 
discretion to avoid stacking § 924(c) sentences.191   
In what is a sign-of-the-times development in right-left support for crim-
inal justice reform, bipartisan bills have been introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives192 and the Senate.193    One such bill, the Justice Safety Valve Act 
of 2013, would enable the court to waive the mandatory minimum sentence if 
it did not meet the purposes of punishment outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).194  
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, one of the Senate’s most liberal members 
and an ardent opponent of mandatory minimums, teamed up with Senator 
Rand Paul of Kentucky, one of the darlings of the Tea Party movement and 
also a strong opponent of mandatory sentencing.  Together, they are working 
to transform sentencing and are the bill’s chief Senate co-sponsors.195 
  
 191. Luna & Cassell, supra note 49, at 54, 80-81.  
 192. Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, H.R. 1695 (2013).   
 193. Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, S. 619 (2013).  
 194. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE PAUL-LEAHY “JUSTICE 
SAFETY VALVE ACT OF 2013” S. 619 3 (2013), available at http://famm.org/Repos-
itory/Files/Justice%20Safety%20Valve%20Act%20Primer%20S.%20619.pdf.  
 195. See Patrick Leahy & Rand Paul, Op-Ed, Join Us to Do Away with Mandatory 
Minimums, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 15, 2013, available at http://www.usnews.com/debate-
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In an elegant symmetry, the liberal New York Times Editorial Board   
and conservative opinion leader George Will wrote in support of the bill.  
While the New York Times noted the bill’s potential to eliminate one-size-fits-
all sentencing,196 Will pointed out that “Paul says mandatory minimum    
sentences, in the context of the proliferation of federal crimes, undermine 
federalism, the separation of powers and ‘the bedrock principle that people 
should be treated as individuals.’”197  Both commentaries correctly applaud 
the aim of the bill: to ensure that defendants are treated as individuals.      
Another bill, S. 1410 the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, would reduce 
many drug mandatory minimums, slightly expand the current safety valve, 
and make lower crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentences retroactive; the 
bill was introduced by another bipartisan pair of Senators, Mike Lee (R-UT) 
and Richard Durbin (D-IL).198   
Congressional reformers gained an important new ally in mid-August 
when the Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced new charging policies 
designed to help ensure that mandatory minimum sentences for drug offend-
ers would be reserved for violent and kingpin-level offenders.199  The new 
policy is intended to change the DOJ’s charging practices so that 
certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenders who have no ties to large-
scale organizations, gangs, or cartels will no longer be charged with 
offenses that impose draconian mandatory minimum sentences.  They 
now will be charged with offenses for which the accompanying sen-
tences are better suited to their individual conduct, rather than exces-
sive prison terms . . . .200   
Holder concluded that promoting proportionate sentencing in this fashion 
would lead to “better . . . public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation – while 
making our expenditures smarter and more productive.”201  Holder referred 




 196. Needed: A New Safety Valve, N.Y. TIMES, at A20, June 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/opinion/needed-a-new-safety-valve.html?_r= 
0&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1372079871-z+f+tNeJYRdVFHVJUrqRyA.  
 197. George Will, Seeking Sense on Sentencing, CECILDAILY.COM (June 5, 2013, 
4:00 AM) available at http://www.cecildaily.com/opinion/columns/article_864f11ee-
cd82-11e2-9e27-0019bb2963f4.html.  
 198. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013) 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.1410:.  
 199. See Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-
130812.html.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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play and pledged his support, and that of President Barack Obama, to advanc-
ing mandatory minimum reform.202 
Shortly after Holder’s speech, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee noticed a full committee hearing on the topic of mandatory minimum 
sentencing and, in a nod to the reform spirit sweeping conservative and Re-
publican circles, called two Republicans to testify in support of reform.203  
Witnesses at the hearing clearly addressed the fiscal impact of sentencing, but 
also the human impact of sentences out of proportion to the offenses they 
punish.  This wedding of practicality and proportionality bodes well for sen-
tencing reform. The Smarter Sentencing Act passed the Senate Judiciary 
Committee with bi-partisan support on January 30, 2014.204   
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Federal lawmakers should be, and increasingly appear to be, concerned 
about the threat to public safety of federal prison overcrowding, caused in 
part by mandatory minimum sentencing.  They should also be concerned 
about the unfairness of disproportionate sentencing made necessary by man-
datory minimums.  Taking a page from the ringing endorsement of propor-
tionality embodied in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller and Congress’s 
provision of individualized sentencing at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and taking 
heart from the new bipartisan effort to address mass incarceration and its 
costs, Congress should take on the task of reforming mandatory minimum 
sentences.  It appears more likely than ever that reform is precisely what 
many in Congress plan to do. 
 
  
 202. Id.  
 203. Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=d3ddc8eaa9b9f780d5af0a5
54e5fcf98.  
 204. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.1410:. 
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